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ABSTRACT
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Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Kursat Aydogan
February 1991, 91 Pages
The main purpose of this study is to investigate
empirically the impact of merger on stockholder risk. 
Mergers between LSE firms during the period 1983~1986 are 
examined.
The literature provides three major hypotheses concerning 
merger and risk. These are tested to see whether the 
magnitude and the direction of change in risk following 
mergers is compatible with what is hypothesized. To gai 
further insight, the discrepancy between the systemati 
risk of the merged firm and that predicted by CAPM 
modelled using several market variables.Market model 
employed to estimate three measures of risk: Systemati
unsystematic, total.
n
Given the limitations of the sample and research design, 
mergers are found to be associated with an increase in 
systematic risk over what is hypothesized. The absolute 
difference of premerger systematic risks of acquiring and 
acquired firms and financial leverage of the merged firm 
are found to explain the discrepancy between the actual and 
hypothesized level. On the contrary to systematic r-isk, 
unsystematic risk has not changed relative to premerger 
value of the acquiring company.
The findings show that on average market takes a riskier 
view of the merged firm than its components and risk 
reduction may not be a valid rationale for mergers. 
Stockholders must question the mergers justified on the 
basis of risk reduction alone, since they can achieve the 
same reduction in unsystematic risk by portfolio 
diversification and mergers do not provide any benefits in 
terms of systematic risk reduction.
Key words:
Merger, acquiring firm, acquired firm, 
p/e game, risk reducing effect, 
unsystematic risk. Market Model, OLS.
portiuiiü еттесс, 
systematic risk.
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Bu çalışmanın temel amacı a m p i r  'i 1- o 1 a r  a к > i г  k e t
birleşmelerinin hissedar riski üzerindeki etkisini 
araştı rmaktı r. 1983-1986 zaman aralıamda Londra r'inrsasına
kayıtlı şirketler arasında meydana qelen şirket 
biri esmeleri incelenrni sti r.
Konuyla ilgili literatür, s 
konusunda üç adet hipotez 
birleşmelerini takiben oluşan, 
ve yönünün hipotez edilen 
etmiştir. Buna ek olarak, 
düşüncesiyle, birle sme s. o n t' a s 
riski ve CAPM tarafından tahmi 
çeşitli piyasa faktörleri 
sistematik, toplam ve sistemat 
için de Pivasa modeli kullanıl
irket birleşmeleri ve risk 
ver i r. Bu ca11 sma. s i rket
risk değişiminin büvüklüdü 
değerlere uvgunlugunu test 
konuya açı kİık qeti recea i 
1 oluşan şirketin .sistematik 
n edilen risk arasındaki fark 
kul l.anı 1 ar-îk mr;de 11 enmiş ve 
ik olmav.an riski tahmin etmek 
mı s.ti r
Şirket bi rlesmelerinin, sistematik ri.şki hipotezlerle 
açı kİ anamavan bir şekilde arttırdiaı 'loz i erim i-r. i r-. .¿i.nc.-k ou 
sonuç örneklemdeki ve araştırma yöntemindeki kıs,'tl.em.ala·· 
ıSi’S''nda de';^erlsndi r i İmel idi r. Ber'.-fii.- ve h i no tez eoilen 
sistematik risk, dscerleri arasındaki farkı açıklamak
amacıyla yapılan model lemede, iıirleşme öncesindeki 
şirketlerin sistematik riskleri arasındaki mutlak fark ve 
birleşme sonrası oluşan şirketin bo-rç or-anı -v'iKİavıcı
bulunmuştur. Birleşmeyi takiben sistematik riskte mevdsrıa 
gelen artışa karsın sistematik olmavan risk sai'in alan 
şirketin birleşme öncesi değeriyle karşılaştırıldığında, 
bir artış göstermemiştir.
Bulgular, piyasanın genelde birleşme sonrası oluşan şirketi 
birleşmeyi meydana getiren şirketlerden daha riskli
değerlendirdiğini ortaya koymuştur. Hissedarlar, sistematik 
olmayan riski kendi portföylerini oluşturarak 
dağıtabilecekleri ve şirket birleşmeleri sistematik risk 
açısındanda bir fayda sağlamadığı için, sadece risk
indirgeme amacıyla gerçekleştirilen şirket birleşmeleri 
sorgulanmalıdır.
Anahtar sözcükler: Şirket birleşmesi, satın alan şirket, 
satın alınan şirket, portföy etkisi, fiyat/kazanç oranı, 
risk azaltma etkisi, sistematik risk, sistematik olmayan 
risk, piyasa modeli, OLS.
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1. INTRODUCTION:
1.1. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT:
A controversial issue about mergers has been their impact 
on stockholders' wealth.
A number of hypotheses have been proposed about mergers. 
Value maximizing hypotheses have been in support of 
stockholder wealth maximization as being a motive for 
mergers. On the other hand non-value maximizing hypotheses 
argued that managers of bidding firms rely upon 
acquisitions to maximize their utility (their compensation 
may be tied to the size of the firm in terms of sales or 
assets) at the expense of stockholders.
The value maximizing hypotheses predict that the wealth of 
stockholders of both acquiring and target firms increases 
as a result of acquisition and value creation is evidenced. 
Various reasons for value creation from mergers are usually 
given. These include economies of scale, economies of 
scope, attainment of market power, financial advantage, tax 
considerations, diversification and others.
According to finance theory, value can be created for 
stockholders by either increasing the return or decreasing 
the systematic risk of firm's common stock.
Most of the studies done examined the stockholder return 
implications of mergers. The UK studies (1), although their 
samples covered different time periods, reached similar 
conclusions that the acquirers either gained slightly or 
did not lose, while the acquired had substantial positive 
residuals prior to the merger. However these have been 
found to be rather short-term effects tailing off in the 
post merger period. The US studies (2) , in contrast to many 
undertaken in UK, found positive, net increases in 
shareholder wealth which are not lost shorthly after the 
merger.
The investigation of risk is as equally important as return 
since a reduction in the former could lead to an increase 
in the stockholder wealth. Although it did not receive much 
popularity, research on risk could add to the studies done 
on return , by enabling us to get a complete picture 
of the impact of merger on stockholders' wealth.
This study estimates the change in systematic, unsystematic 
and total risk following a merger, and tests three 
hypotheses about the impact of merger on risk, namely 
"portfolio effect", "p/e game" and "risk reducing effect".
(1) Firth (1976), Franks, Boyles and Hecht (1977), Barnes 
(1978), Firth (1980), Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986), 
Frank and Harris (1986).
(2) Mandelker (1974), Langetieg (1978), Dodd (1980), 
Schipper and Thompson (1980), Asquith (1982), Asquith and 
Kim (1982).
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The difference between the systematic risk of the merged 
firm and that predicted by CAPM is also modelled using 
several market related variables.
1.2. THE METHODOLOGY OP THE STUDY;
The present study is an empirical investigation into the 
impact of merger on stockholder risk. The following three 
hypotheses, as provided by the literature are tested.
-The portfolio effect; predicts the risk attributes of the 
merged firm to be equal to those of a market value weighted 
portfolio of the acquiring and acquired firms' stocks.
-The p/e game; predicts the risk attributes of the 
merged firm to be equal to those of the acquiring firm.
-The risk reducing effect; predicts the risk level of the 
merged firm to be less than that of the acquiring firm.
An alternative hypothesis is put forward to make for the 
case where the change in risk attributes is not explained 
by any of the above three hypotheses.
To test these hypotheses, premerger and post merger
systematic and unsystematic risks are estimated using the
Market model (1).
(1) Market model;
Kit: the return on security i
Rj[jt· the return on a general market index
^it* residual factor
The study also atempts to explain the merger induced 
change in systematic risk (if any exits) . The difference 
between the systematic risk of the merged firm and that 
predicted by CAPM is modelled. OLS is used to explain the 
difference where absolute difference in the systematic risk 
of acquiring and acquired firms, premerger relative 
variance and premerger relative size of the acquiring and 
acquired firms form the independent variables. Since the 
"portfolio effect" hypothesis predicts the risk attributes 
of the merged firm to be equal to that predicted by CAPM, 
modelling can only be done if this hypothesis is rejected.
1.3. SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT DATA:
1.3.1. The time period covered:
A sample of 31 mergers between LSE firms are taken during 
the period 1983-1986. Eighty percent of the sample comes 
from 1985, whereas the other twenty percent comes from 
83,84, and 86.
Table 1 provides data on expenditure upon, numbers of and 
financing of domestic acquisitions by UK industrial and 
commercial companies in 1983-1986.
The period is characterized by a substantial increase in 
the expenditures which is not accompanied by a commensurate 
increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions. The
TABLE 1 Expenditure upon, numbers of, and financing of 
acquisitions and mergers by UK industrial and commercial 
companies
YEARS #(i) Exp.(2) Exp.(3) Cash Ordinary Fixed. I]
1983 447 2343 497 43.8 53.8 2.4
1984 568 5474 976 53.8 33.6 12.6
1985 474 7090 1044 40.3 52.3 7.4
1986 695 13535 1576 17.9 63.8 18.3
(1) Number of acquisitions and mergers.
(2) Actual expenditure (usually the stock market value of 
the successful offer) in sterling million.
(3) Actual expenditure deflated by the FT Actuaries 
Industrial Ordinary Share Index, 1962=100.
(4) Percentages of expenditure accounted for by cash, 
issues of ordinary, issues of fixed interest.
SOURCE: Hughes (1990)
present merger wave is therefore the product of relatively 
few and massive mergers. Another striking feature is the 
decrease in the % of cash and increase in the % of issues 
of ordinary shares and fixed interest. The sample taken 
also shows the characteristics of the period such that on 
average the relative market capitalisation of acquiring and 
acquired firms is almost one, indicating the tendency to
bid for firms as big as the acquirer's own firm.
Table 2 shows the distribution, by type of integration, of 
the numbers and value of assets to be acquired in proposed 
mergers. The classification of mergers has been a 
controversial issue due to coexistence of elements of 
horizontal, vertical and conglomerate expansion. The table 
is based on the classification done by Office of Fair 
Trading. There has been an increse in the % number of 
diversifying mergers and in 1985 these have accounted for 
over a half of all assets involved in proposed mergers.
If the sample is representative of the period, then the 
results of this study can provide valuable insight by 
showing us the extent of diversification achieved by 
acquiring firms following mergers.
TABLE 2 The distribution, by type of integration, of the 
munbers and value of assets to be acquired in proposed 
mergers considered by the Mergers Panel, 1983-1985
YEAR Total # % Horizontal Vertical % Diversifying
# Assets # Assets # Assets
1983 192 71 73 4 1 25 26
1984 259 63 79 4 1 33 20
1985 192 58 42 4 4 38 54
SOURCE: Hughes (1990)
1.3.2. Data sources:
The sample of mergers is taken from Acquisitions Monthly 
and Financial Times.
The daily stock price data for the acquiring firm and index 
values for the Ft-All Share Index are taken from Datastream 
Data File. Since security price data does not exist for the 
acquired firms, calculated systematic and unsystematic risk 
values are taken from London Risk Measurement Service.
2. LITERATURE SURVEY:
Parallel bodies of research about mergers have developed in 
the field of both strategic management and finance. 
Finance researchers tried to measure the merger induced 
change in the stockholder risk and to explain the shift in 
risk by using some market related variables. In contrast 
strategic management researchers predicted that the 
magnitude and the direction of the shift would be 
determined by the degree to which the merging businesses 
are related. Below, the studies from both finance and 
strategic management fields, which have examined the impact 
of merger on stockholder risk, are reviewed.
2.1 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT:
Montgomery and Singh (1984) examined the relationship 
between the market risk (beta) of a firm and its corporate 
"^^ 3^,tegy of diversification. They argued that unrelated 
diversifiers may be different from related diversifiers in 
ways which influence beta and proposed three such 
differences, namely low market power, low capital intensity 
and high debt positions which were shown to lead to high 
market risk by the literature.
They found that unrelated diversifiers have higher market 
risk than related diversifiers and that the high debt
positions and low market power of unrelated diversifiers 
have contributed to this.
Lubatkin and O'Neill (1987) examined the changes in^  risk 
associated with a large group of acguiring firms, grouped 
by the degree of relatedness of their mergers. On the 
contrary to the financial theory, mergers tended to result 
in higher unsystematic and total risk and only one type of 
merger, related, demonstrated the ability to decrease 
systematic risk. They focused bn posited fundamental 
differences in market power and competitive advantage as 
the reason for lower systematic risk attained by related 
diversifiers.
Sidney L. Barton (1988), in a direct follow-up study to 
Montgomery and Singh (1984), adressed the issue of whether 
the strategic type (i.e. related or unrelated) has a direct 
effect on investors' perception of market risk or investors 
merely react to a firm's financial context to assess the 
systematic risk, regardless of strategy.
They examined three variables namely, market power, 
capital intensity and financial leverage for firms 
classified into four different categories based on their 
diversification strategies. They concluded that, although 
investors were wary of the systematic risk of the unrelated
diversifiers compared to related, they were willing to 
reduce their high assesment of systematic risk if a 
specific firm showed high profitability, low debt, and high 
capital intensity.
Lubatkin and Rogers (1989), different from previous 
studies, not only examined the effect of diversification 
strategies on systematic risk but also shareholders' 
return.
They found that related diversifiers have achieved a lower 
systematic risk accompanied by a corresponding higher 
return compared to unrelated diversifiers.
Chatterjee and Lubatkin (1990), similar to the previous 
studies, examined the changes in systematic risk associated 
with acquiring firms, grouped by the degree of relatedness 
of their mergers. However, different from previous studies, 
they controlled for the systematic risk of the target 
firm, corrected any leverage effect induced by merger and 
the possible problems of heteroskedasticity and estimated 
the shifts in risk over daily as well as monthly time 
horizons.
In line with previous studies, they found related mergers 
to have achieved a reduction in systematic risk due to 
their ability to exploit operating and collusive
10
synergies.However, on the contrary to the previous studies, 
unrelated mergers have also been effective in reducing 
systematic risk. The authors argued that this finding may
-.4
be explained by the different risk characteristics depicted 
by related and unrelated acquiring firms prior to merging.
2.2 FINANCE STUDIES;
Langetieg, Haugen and Wichern (1980) examined the impact 
of merger on risk related attributes of stockholder return 
distribution, namely systematic, unsystematic and total 
risk. They tested the following three hypotheses as 
provided by the literature.
- The portfolio effect; which is simply an application of 
portfolio theory, argues that the consolidated or the 
merged firm should expect the same risk attributes as a 
market value weighted portfolio of the acquiring and 
acquired firms' stocks.
- The p/e game; argues that the merged firm takes on the 
risk attributes of the acquiring firm.
~ The risk reducing effect; assumes that mergers are 
moti ted due to "risk reducing effects" and thus the risk 
level of the consolidated firm should be less than that of 
the acquiring firm.
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Their results showed that although merger had an impact on 
the stockholder risk, it had not been in the form suggested 
by the literature. On the average they found mergers to be 
associated with an unexpected increase in the levels of 
both systematic, total and unsystematic risk for the merged 
firm.
Haugen and Langetieg (1975) argued that the possible 
existence of synergy following mergers, whether be in the 
form of financial, operating or collusive synergies, could 
alter the risk position of the equity. According to their 
argument the existence of synergy would be evidenced if 
merged firms exhibit a significant change in risk from 
market value weighted portfolio of the acquired and 
acquiring firms' stocks prior to merger. They found that 
the number of instances there was such a change was not 
significantly different from the number associated with a 
control group of firms that did not merge.Thus their study 
although failed to find any evidence for synergy supported 
the portfolio hypothesis stated above.
Mandelker (1974) examined the merger associated changes in 
systematic risk via a moving average beta. He found the 
direction of change in risk to be unpredictable. However 
this finding can not necessarily be attributed to the 
impact of merger, since there remains the possibility of
12
attaining this result due to general instability in beta 
which has not been controlled in the study.
Lev and Mandelker (1972) in a study examining the 
microeconomic consequences of mergers, found no significant 
difference between the changes in betas for acquiring firms 
and the changes in betas for a control group matched by 
industry, size and the time period, a result consistent 
with "the p/e game" hypothesis.
The Weston, Smith and Schrieves study (1972), found the 
total and unsystematic risks of the conglomerate firms to 
be substantially higher than those of mutual funds. Thus 
they rejected the risk reduction motive as the major 
objective of conglomerate mergers.
Melicher and Rush (1973) did not find beta as high as 
Weston, Smith and Shrieves, but they did find conglomerate 
firm betas to be significantly higher than those of their 
non-conglomerate sample.
Joehnk and Nielsen (1974) in a study examining major 
mergers of conglomerates and non—conglomerates , found that 
conglomerate type of merger activity whether undertaken by 
conglomerates or non-conglomerates resulted in higher 
levels of systematic risk. Their results also showed the
13
change in betas to be a function of premerger beta and
(1) values of the acquired and acquiring firms.
They employed a multiple regression model to explain the 
change in betas (postmerger beta - premerger beta) of 
acquiring firms by a number of variables describing the 
premerger characteristics of the acquirer and the target. 
The following independent variables were used:
-the absolute difference in premerger betas for 
acquiring and target firms
i.e I premerger beta (acquirer)-premerger beta (target)]
-the relative premerger p^ level
i.e.premer.p^ of acquired firm-premer.p^ of acquiring firm
premer. p^ of acquiring firm
-the market capitalisation of the acquiring firm
-the relative size of the market value of equity of the 
acquired firm to the acquiring firm prior to the
merger
i.e. market value of the acquired firm's stock 
market value of the acquiring firm's stock
The regression results obtained for the non-conglomerate 
firms (i.e. non-conglomerate firms engaged in conglomerate
(1) p^; the coefficient of determination of the market
model Rit-Ait +
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merger activity) showed that the immediate postmerger betas 
of these firms were responsive to premerger beta 
characteristics. No variable was found to be significant 
for the conglomerate firms which are engaged in 
conglomerate merger activity.
In a similar study, Thompson (1983) modelled the shift in 
the acquirer beta. In addition to the variables used by 
Joehnk and Nielsen (1974), the following variables are 
added to the multiple regression model:
-the degree of conglomerateness of the merger
-the ratio of long-term debt to total assets averaged 
over a period before and after the merger
-the difference in premerger variance of returns relative 
to the acquiring firms' variance
i.e (variance of acquiring firm - variance of target firm) 
(variance of the acquiring firm)
He found the difference in the premerger variances of the 
two firms relative to the acquiring firm's variance to be 
significant.
Barr and van den Honert (1988) proposed a modification to 
Thompson's (1983) study. They modelled not the change in
15
the systematic risk of the acquiring firm before and after 
merger but the difference between systematic risk of the 
merged firm and that predicted by capital market theory on 
the basis of constituent firms' betas.
Secondly based on the studies of Hamada (1972) and 
Rubinstein (1973), they carried out their analyisis using 
ungeared or intrinsic betas to remove any complications 
caused by the debt restructuring of the merged firm.
Their analysis showed shifts in beta (unexplained by the 
capital market theory) due to merger. A multivariate 
regression model was employed to explain this shift and 
prior holding position (2), relative size (3) and relative 
variance (4) were found to be significant. The results 
also demonstrated that the shifts in intrinsic betas could 
be more satisfactorily explained than shifts in equity 
betas by the regression model.
The present study is similar to the studies done by 
Laugen, Hangetieg and Wichern (1980) and Barr and van der 
Honert (1984) in terms of methodology but different from
(1) prior holding position of the acquiring firm in the 
target firm immediately prior to the merger announcement
(2) the ratio of the premerger market capitalisations of 
the acquiring and target firms
(3) the difference in the premerger variance of returns of 
the acquirer and target firms relative to the acquiring 
firm's variance
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them in terms of the time period covered and the firms 
examined. The former examined the mergers between NYSE 
firms from the period 1929 through 1960s. The later study's 
sample consisted of mergers and acquisitions of firms 
listed in Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) between 1976 
and 1984. This study examines mergers and acquisitions of 
firms listed in LSE between 1983 and 1986.
Another difference has been the incorporation of 
strategic management perspective in the arguments made 
although lack of data precluded the utilization of their 
methodologies. Classifying mergers based on their 
relatedness , testing the given hypotheses about the risk 
impact of mergers for each category of merger and 
explaining the change in beta with additional explanatory 
variables such as market power, capital intensity, can 
contribute substantially to the present study.
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY;
3.1. THE MODEL:
The most common model to be used in the empirical research 
on mergers is the market model which is developed by Sharpe 
(1964) based on the earlier work of Markowitz (1952).
The model specifies the following relationship.
^it “ ^it ®it ^ t  ^it
the return on security i,
the return on a general market index, 
i.e FT All-Share Index
the normally, independently and identically 
distributed stochastic factor reflecting that portion of 
security i's return which is not a linear function of Rjjjf
Aft, the intercept and the slope of the linear
function.
Cov = 0
The empirical validity of the market model has been 
examined extensively in the literature. The following 
conclusions are reached (Blume 1971).
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-The linearity assumption of the model is adequate.
-The variables can not be assumed independent between
securities because of the existence of industry effects. 
However these industry effects have shown to account for 
only about ten percent of the variation in returns, thus 
they can be ignored as a first approximation.
-The firm specific factors correspond more closely to
non-normal state variables than to normal ones.
Fama (1968) and Jensen (1969) have shown that market model 
is still valid under the assumption that the Uit's are non­
normal state variables.
The model asserts that the risk associated with any stock 
can be broken into two components:
Systematic component, (Bj^ R^jjj|.) which reflects common 
movement of a single securty's return with the average 
return of all other securities in the market (proxied by a 
market index).
Firm specific component, which reflects the residual 
portion of a securty's return that moves independently of 
the market return.
Sources of firm specific risk (unsystematic risk) are
19
specific to a firm such as technological change, 
banktruptcy, strikes, fire at a production facility 
etc. (Lubakin and O'Neill, 1987). It is estimated by the 
variance of residuals in the market model.
Sources of systematic risk are events that have economy 
wide impacts, which are reflected in the returns of all 
securities. Examples of systematic risk factors include 
changes in monetary and fiscal policies, tax laws, 
political situation etc. Systematic risk is estimated by 
the slope of the market model.
Within the context of this model, the variance of portfolio 
return is defined as:
var(Rp) = (1/N) var(uT) + (B)^ var(^) 
where;
var(Uj^ ) = the average variance of the non-market 
related factor (U^ )
var(Rjjj) = the variance of the market return
B = weighted average of Bj^ 's
= (Vi/Vp)Bj^ + (Vj/VpjBj + ...... + (Vn/Vp)B„
dollar investment in security 1 
Vp= total dollar value of the portfolio 
beta of security 1
20
As N (the number of securities in the portfolio) increases, 
1/N approaches zero and the portfolio variance becomes 
equal to the second term var(R^).Thus for a diversified 
portfolio, a security's contribution to the risk of the 
portfolio is measured by its (beta).
3.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CAPM:
3.2.1. Unsystematic risk:
According to CAPM, since an individual investor can achieve 
a reduction in unsystematic risk by diversifying his or 
her own portfolio, a corporate merger does not necessarily 
create opportunities for risk diversification over or 
beyond what was possible to investors prior to the merger 
(Levy and Sarnat, 1970).
However the existence of various market imperfections, such 
as indivisibilities of assets, costs of acquiring 
information, monitoring of large number of assets and 
transaction costs (Levy and Sarnat, 1970), may lead to 
gains from risk pooling in acquisitions such that 
acquisition achieves benefits that can not be duplicated by 
the investor.
In addition, there also exists some unsystematic risk 
reduction benefits that can not be duplicatable through
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"homemade diversification" which are related to the actual 
merging of future cash flows.
This is inherent in pure financial theory of merger, first 
represented by Lewellen (1971) and later refined by Higgins 
and Schall (1975) . According to their argument, there could 
be a potential for more borrowing for the merged firm due 
to its large size, latent debt capacity coming from the 
acquisition of a less levered firm and reduction in the 
probability of bankruptcy (i.e.if some positive probability 
of banktruptcy is assumed for each individual firm, the 
joint probability of such an event is reduced by the merger 
due to imperfectly correlated income streams). The later 
leads to a reduction in lender's risk and hence a decline 
in the cost of borrowing. In the presence of taxes, 
increase use of debt results in an increase in shareholder 
wealth since interest expenses carry a tax subsidy. The 
increase of wealth, however occurs not from a reduction in 
risk but from higher expected cash flows.
In the case of merger of two companies with weakly 
correlated income streams, modern financial theory predicts 
a sharp drop in the unsystematic risk. Lubatkin and O'Neill 
(1987) argue that this prediction applies in instances of 
stockholder diversification but may not apply for
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corporate diversification. When stockholders diversify, the 
expected variance of the combined returns is a linear 
extention of past variance minus the covariance between the 
income streams. However when corporations merge, the 
expected variance need not be a linear extention of 
historical variances. Mergers will not necessarily reduce 
unsystematic risk because management actions may alter the 
underlying risk profiles of the combining businesses in 
positive and negative ways.Introduction of effective 
control systems, technological advances, and improved 
sources of capital may reduce the unsystematic risk of the 
newly acquired firm. Conversely management may also bring 
new sources of risk. According to Lubatkin and O'Neill 
(1987) "The differences in managerial styles and control 
systems, the ever present threat of layoffs that come with 
consolidation of departments, the initial inequities in 
compensation, the authority superimposed on the acquired 
company, all bring about inefficiencies that may negate the 
possible benefits of mergers."
It can be concluded that, in the case of mergers, the 
reduction in unsystematic risk may create a true economic 
gain as a result of the financial synergies which can not 
be achieved by forming a portfolio of the individual shares 
of the two companies and market imperfections.
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Secondly, in contrast to stockholder diversification 
mergers may not necessarily result in a decline in 
unsystematic risk. The change in unsystematic risk is 
unpredictable and depends on the management intervention 
which could be negative (i.e. administrative pitfalls), 
or positive.
3.2.2. Systematic risk:
According to finance theory, beta should be the risk 
measure of concern to a manager aiming to maximize 
stockholder wealth.
A number of studies have sought to explain the factors 
that affect the systematic risk potential of common 
stocks.These factors are generally represented by a set of 
potential accounting and financial corporate variables such 
as dividend payout, asset growth, leverage, liquidity, 
asset size and earnings variability.
It has been argued that if a firm changes its financial 
and operating decisions and the market estimates that these 
actions will affect the corporation's return and risk 
characteristics, beta can be expected to change. Therefore 
merger causing to severe financial and operating 
changes, may result in a change in beta.
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Following theoretical arguments about beta have been put 
forward:
-Market power: Subrahmanyan and Thomadakis (1980) argued
that monopoly power implies lower beta. Thus mergers which 
provide the commitment of large percentages of corporate 
resources to one market or to the vertical integration that 
may be necessary to capture key competitive positions in 
the market, may lead to a reduction in beta.
-Capital intensity: Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis (1980) also 
argued that as the labor/capital ratio increases, beta will 
increase. This follows from the monopoly power argument, in 
the sense that mergers which did not provide vertical 
integration or focus of resources in one business will lead 
to low capital intensity, thus a higher beta.
-Financial leverage: Hamada (1972) and Rubinstein (1973)
showed that debt financing magnifies a firm's intrinsic 
risk, as measured by the beta with no debt financing. Thus;
= (1 + D/S) B* 
where;
B = beta with no debt financing, intrinsic beta 
B^ j = beta after debt financing, equity beta 
S = total market value of the stock after debt financing 
D = total market value of the debt
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As can be seen from the above relationship, financial 
structure has a non-linear multiplicative effect on 
intrinsic operating risk.
-Level of cyclicality: Unsystematic risk has been shown to 
be positively correlated with systematic risk (Amit and 
Livnat, 1988, Lev, 1974). Portfolio theory which argues for 
a decline in unsystematic risk following a diversification 
suggests an indirect effect on systematic risk (i.e a 
decline in systematic risk).
Therefore to the extent a merger act is associated with a 
change in the above variables, beta could be expected to 
change.
There is substantial amount of evidence in the literature 
about the increase in the post merger financial leverage. 
Shrieves and Pashley (1980), after controlling for firm 
size and industry effects, found that mergers resulted in 
significant increases in financial leverage. Studies done 
by Weston and Mashinghka (1971), Melicher and Rush (1974), 
Stevens (1973) found that conglomerate mergers yielded 
significant post-merger increases in debt to equity ratios. 
Markham (1973), also reported an increase in leverage, as 
evidenced by the incresed interest payments of the 
acquired firm after the merger.
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This study, will examine neither the change that has taken 
place (if exits) in the above variables such as market 
power, capital intensity etc. nor the accounting variables 
such as dividend payout, liquidity, asset growth etc. 
following a merger. These have been explained in order to 
shed light on why merger could lead to a change in 
systematic risk of the merged firm, compared to that 
predicted by CAPM and that of the acquiring firm before the 
merger.
3.3. THE SAMPLE PROFILE:
The total sample consists of 31 mergers between LSE firms, 
taken from the period 1983-1986 (1) . The mergers are
selected from the Financial Times and Acquisitions Monthly, 
based on the following criteria:
1- The firms must have at least 400 days of available 
security price data in the period surrounding the merger.
2- For each merger, included in the sample both firms must 
not have merged more than once in the 200 days before and 
after merger date.
3- The merged firm should be alive today.
The use of first screening criterion is necessary to insure
(1) The sample is given in Appendix 1.
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a minimum amount of data for analysis. The second criterion 
ensures that the regression coefficients estimated over 
the full 150 days before and 150 days after the event will 
reflect only the influence of a single merger event.
The acquiring firms are all members of FT-All Share Index, 
which are typically large companies. This and the use of 
third criterion unavoidibly limits the sample to successful 
mergers. Thus one should be cautious about the 
generalizability of the results of this study to other 
mergers.
3.4. METHODOLOGY OF ESTIMATION:
The present study employs the market model. Two seperate 
regressions will be run; one for the premerger period to 
estimate the systematic and unsystematic risk of the 
acquiring firm, and second for the post merger period to 
estimate the systematic and unsystematic risk of the merged 
firm.
Estimations are done over a 150 day period beginning 200 
days before 50 days after the legal transaction date to 
ensure that the estimates are not biased by short term 
uncertanities caused by the negotiations for the merger.
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3.4.1. The use of daily security returns data:
Researchers who use the market research methodology, use 
either daily or monthly returns data. This study uses daily 
returns data. Both advantages and disadvantages of using 
daily returns over monthly returns have been cited in the 
literature.
Blume (1971) showed that, although the constant beta 
assumption is reasonable for large portfolios, it does not 
hold in the case of individual stock betas due to specific 
company connected events.
In the case of monthly returns data, their required long 
horizon (60 months before and 60 months after the merger) 
to calculate premerger and post merger betas, increases the 
likelihood of extraneous events being captured. On the 
other hand the use of daily returns, by allowing one to 
isolate more effectively the market's reaction to the 
merger due to the shorter time period required for 
calculations (200 days before and 200 days after the 
merger), not only increases the power of statistical tests 
but also provides greater stationarity for beta.
However some disadvantages of using daily returns data are 
also given in the literature.
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The daily stock return for an individual security exhibits 
substantial departures from normality that are not 
observed with monthly data. The evidence generally suggests 
that distributions of daily returns are fat tailed relative 
to a normal distribution (Fama, 1976).
Scholes and Williams (1977) pointed to the problem of non- 
synchronous trading with daily data which occurs when the 
return on a security and the return on the market index are 
each measured over a different trading interval. It is 
proposed that this could lead to bias and inconsistencies 
in OLS estimates of the market model parameters.
In a study examining the properties of daily stock returns 
and how the particular characteristics of these data affect 
event study methodologies. Brown and Warner (1985) 
concluded that daily data generally presents few 
difficulties for event studies, and the market model which 
it is based on, is well specified.
3.5. HYPOTHESES:
The three major hypotheses as provided by the literature 
are tested in this study.
1-Portfolio Effect:
It argues that legal union of two firms does not produce
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any risk effects different from which otherwise accompany 
an informal purchase of both companies' shares by the 
portfolio investor. Thus the merged firm should expect the 
same risk attributes as a market value weighted portfolio 
of the acquiring and the target firms' stocks.
CAPM predicts the systematic and unsystematic risks of a 
market value weighted portfolio as follows:
Bp = w^  ^ + W2 B2
var(U ) = (Wj )^  ^ varCU^) + var(U2)
where;
Bp = portfolio beta
B^ = acquired firm's beta
B2 = acquiring firm's beta
var(U^) = unsystematic risk of the portfolio
XT
var(U^) = unsystematic risk of the acquired firm
var(U2 ) = unsystematic risk of the acquiring firm
Wf, W2 = weights of acquired firm and acquiring firm in the
portfolio
2-P/E Game:
According to this hypothesis, markets often evaluate the 
combined earnings of the two firms using the acquirer's 
preraerger p/e. This results in instantaneous capital gains
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if the acquirer's p/e is higher than that of the acquired. 
In our case, if the merged firm takes on the risk 
attributes of the acquiring firm, this will support the p/e 
game. This hypothesis will be consistent with portfolio 
effect if the betas of the acquiring and acquired firms 
are identical.
3- Risk Reducing Effect:
The last hypothesis argues for the merged firm's risk level 
to be lower than that of the acquirer, thus being a motive 
for merger. Whilst it contradicts directly with p/e game, 
it is not necessarily inconsistent with portfolio effect 
since risk reducing effect may be due to portfolio effect. 
Other sources of risk reduction may come from the 
intervention of management in positive ways, introducing 
more effective control systems, technological advances and 
improved sources of capital, transference of managerial 
know-how, technical and scale economies (Lubatkin and 
O'Neill, 1987).
The hypotheses concerning the "portfolio effect", the "p/e 
game" and the "risk reducing effect" are summarized in 
Table 3.
Finally, an alternative hypothesis has been proposed which 
is defined as the case where change in risk is not
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TABLE 3 Hypotheses for systematic, unsystematic and 
total risks
Portfolio 
Efffeet
Portfolio
Effect
P/E Game Risk Reducing 
Effect
= Bp
var(Uj^)=var(Up)
var(R^)=var(Rp)
P/E Consistent Bm “ B2Game
only if var (Uj^ )=var (U2)
if = B2 var(Rjj )^=var (R2)
Risk Consistent Bm B2Reducing
Effect only if Inconsistent var(Uj )^ < var(U2)
Bm = Bp var(R^) < var(R2)
var(Um) = var(Up)
ATION;
var(U); unsystematic· risk 
var(R); total risk
B; systematic risk
1; acquired firm 
2 ; acquiring firm 
m; merged firm
p; market value weighted portfolio of acquiring and 
acquired firms' stocks
33
explained by any of the proceeding hypotheses (Haugen, 
Wichern and Langetieg, 1980).
3.5.1. Statistical Tests:
In this study, the "portfolio effect" and the "p/e game" 
are explicitly tested. The presence of "risk reducing 
effect" is inferred if the "p/e game" is rejected and the 
rejection is followed by a risk reduction.
In testing the hypotheses about systematic risk, the key 
statistic is the difference between the hypothesized risk 
level and the merged firm's risk level. The difference (dj^ ) 
for each merger is standardized by dividing each (dj^ ) with 
its estimated standard deviation (SD(dj^ )). This is done 
because a merger induced change in variance of the error 
term (causing it to become heteroskedastic), may lead to 
biased t-statistics on the coefficients (Chatterjee and 
Lubatkin, 1990).
. . *Next standardized differences (d^  ^ ) are aggregated and 
averaged (d) . Assuming that the distribution of (d^) , the 
aggregate average difference is approximately normal (i.e 
Central Limit Theorem), expected value of (d), E(d) must be 
equal to zero under both the "portfolio effect" and the 
"p/e game". Finally to test E(d)=0, a (l-2a) percent
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confidence interval is constructed. Both hypotheses can 
not be rejected if zero is included in the confidence 
interval.
Hypotheses about the unsystematic and total risk are 
tested using F test. The test statistics for systematic, 
unsystematic and total risks are given in Appendix 2.
3.6. MODELLING THE CHANGE IN BETA:
The difference in the systematic risk of the merged firm 
and that predicted by CAPM on the basis of acquiring and 
acquired firms' betas is modelled.
According to CAPM, the beta of the merged firm;
E(Bjjj) = Wt Вт + Wp В2 ^2
E(Bjjj) = CAPM prediction of the beta of the merged firm.
B^ = OLS estimate of the acquired firm's premerger beta 
(market model).
B2 = OLS estimate of the acquiring firm's premerger beta 
(market model).
and W2 = weights of acquiring and acquired firms in the 
portfolio based on their market capitalisations.
Е(Вд^ ) - Bj^ ' (systematic risk predicted by CAPM minus OLS 
estimate of the post merger beta); unexplained shifts in 
systematic risk forms the dependent variable in this study.
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^However instead of modelling the change in equity betas 
intrinsic betas are modelled in order to remove any non­
linear effect has debt utilization on beta(Hamada, 1972; 
Rubinstein, 1973). This is especially important in mergers 
when one takes into account the high debt levels following 
mergers.
The predicted intrinsic beta of the merged firm is;
E(B*m) = S/(D + S) (W^ + W2 B2)
E(B*m) = the expected value of the intrinsic beta of the 
merged firm (as predicted by CAPM)
S/(D + S) = equity-to-debt-plus-equity ratio of the merged 
firm
The calculated intrinsic beta is;
Bm'' = S/(S + D) Bm'
Thus the difference between the predicted and calculated 
. * * »intrinsic beta values (E(B m)-Bm ), represents the 
deviation of intrinsic beta from its predicted value under 
the assumptions of CAPM (Barr and van der Honert, 1988).
The regression model utilizes several market related 
explanatory variables. These are similar to those used 
by Joehnk and Nielsen (1974), Thompson (1983) and Barr and 
van der Honert (1984). Other explanatory variables are
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suggested in the literature such as changes in volatility 
of cash flows, revenues, after tax income etc. These are 
ignored due to their dependence on accounting information, 
which may cause difficulties in getting meaningful 
comparative measures (i.e different accounting practices), 
and their non availability at the time of the study.
The regression model is of the form:
Y = Aq + BETAD + A2 RELVAR + A3 RELSIZE
Y = the absolute unexplained difference between the 
calculated and predicted betas of the merged firm.
BETAD= the absolute difference between the acquired and 
acquiring firms' premerger betas.
I acquired firm's premerger beta-acquiring firm's premerger 
beta I
RELVAR= the difference in the premerger variance of 
returns of the acquiring and acquired firms relative to 
that of the acquiring firm.
[var(R2) - var(Rj^)] / var(R2)
RELSIZE= the relative market capitalisations (as measured 
by the market value of stock) of acquired and acquiring 
firms.
MVi / MV2
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3.6.1. The independent regression variables:
The first variable (BETAD) aims at measuring the 
magnitudinal impact, the difference in premerger betas, has 
on the amount of risk unexplained by CAPM.
The combination of firms with different financial and 
operating structures (as would be evidenced by different 
beta values) should lead to substantial changes in the 
systematic risk of the acquiring firm that could not be 
entirely explained by CAPM. Hence greater the difference 
in premerger betas of the acquiring and acquired firms, 
greater should be the risk unexplained by CAPM.
In contrast to the first variable which makes use of 
absolute values, second variable (RELVAR) utilizes the 
relative values. Similar to (BETAD), the relationship 
between (Y) and (RELVAR) should be positive.
The third variable (RELSIZE) is a proxy for the magnitude 
of the acquisition. An acquired firm with a low market 
capitalisation relative to that of the acquiring firm is 
unlikely to affect the variables (i.e market power, capital 
intensity) that are expected to cause a change in acquiring 
firm's beta. In case of low premerger market 
capitalisation ratio, CAPM ends up with a postmerger beta
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value for the acquiring firm not very different from that 
of its premerger value. Thus lower the ratio of premerger 
market capitalisations of the acquired and acquiring firm, 
the smaller should be the risk unexplained by CAPM and vice 
versa.
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION!
4.1. BETA ESTIMATION:
The OLS results for the market model are given in Appendix 
3 .
OLS results indicate that the beta coefficients are 
significant at % 5 and % 1 significance levels in 51 out 
of 58 cases.
The model as a whole is also found to be significant at % 5 
and % 1 levels in 51 out of 58 cases.
Although the results of the t and F tests are satisfactory,
in % 32 of the cases is found to be under 0.05 (1) The
low value may be due to industry risk which is not 
accounted by the market model.
4.2 HYPOTHESES TESTING:
The systematic risk difference scores for each of the 
hypotheses (portfolio effect and p/e game), are summarized 
in Table 4.
Merged firms show on average post merger betas (Bm) that
(1) r2
Less than 0.05 
0.05 <R^< 0.10 
0.10 <R^< 0.20 
Above 0.20
of mergers 
32 %
17 %
20 %
31 %
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TABLE 4 Changes in systematic risk
HYPOTHESES AVG. DIFF (1) STD. AVG. DIFF.(2)
Portfolio
effect
®p"®m -0.02292 0.071823**
P/E game
-0.05861 -0.14112*
NOTE: The difference is defined as the hypothesized risk
level minus the merged firm's risk level.
NOTATION: B, systematic risk 
2 , acquiring firm 
m, merged firm
p, market value weighted portfolio
(1) Average difference score should be interpreted as 
descriptive statistics
(2) The average standardized difference represents the 
cross sectional average of each firm's "difference" divided 
by the standard deviation of the "difference". Hypotheses 
are tested using the average standardized difference and 
two tailed t-tests.
** rejected at % 5 significance level 
* rejected at % 1 significance level
are slightly greater than one would expect for the 
"portfolio effect", "p/e game" or the "risk reducing" 
effect. According to two tailed tests done, using average 
standardized differences, "portfolio effect" is rejected at 
% 5 significance level whereas "p/e game" is rejected at 
the 1 % sinificance level. The rejection of the "p/e game"
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is further followed by an increase in risk.
It can be concluded that the merged firm has experienced an 
increase in systematic risk (beta) not anticipated for by 
any of the three hypotheses.
The results for unsystematic and total risks are given in 
Table 5. On average, there has been no change in the 
unystematic risk of the acquiring firm following the 
merger, as indicated by the F test results.
TABLE 5 Changes in unsystematic and total risks
HYPOTHESES TEST STATISTICS (2)
Portfolio
effect
v(U )=v(U ) 
v(Rp=v(I^) (1)
1.604"'·
P/E game
V(U2>=''(U^ ) 1+ J_V(R2)=v (R„) 71.24■
NOTATION: v(U), unsystematic risk
v(R), total risk
p, market value weighted portfolio 
2 , acquiring firm 
m, merged firm
(1) Portfolio effect for total risk can not be tested due 
to unavailability of necessary data to calculate total 
variability of portfolio returns.
(2) F test is employed to test the hypotheses.
++ accepted at % 5 significance level 
+ accepted at % 1 significance level
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The chosen sample of acquiring firms has shown a tendency 
to acquire firms with slightly higher unsystematic risk 
than theirs (i.e. in % 74 of the mergers unsystematic risk 
of the acquired firm is higher than that of the acquiring).
An explanation for the acceptance of both "portfolio 
effect" and "p/e game" (for unsystematic risk) is provided 
by the observation that the slightly higher unsystematic 
risk of the acquired firm is offsetted by the low market 
value weight it has in the portfolio (% 42 compared to % 57 
of the acquiring firm), making it extremely diffucult to 
discern the difference between the "portfolio effect" and 
"p/e game".
For total risk, the "p/e game" is rejected at the % 1
significance level and the rejection is followed by an 
increase in total risk. This finding provides support for 
the conclusions reached about the change in systematic and 
unsystematic risk levels. Since with the increasing 
systematic risk level one would expect total risk to 
increase as well. ■
Table 6 presents the systematic and unsystematic risks of 
the acquiring and acquired firms, the hypothesized risk 
level from a stockholder merger of the two firms' 
securities, and the risk levels of the merged firm.
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TABLE 6 Systematic and unsystematic risk of acquirer.
acquired and merged firms
Systematic risk Unsystematic risk
Avg. Std. Avg. Std.
Acquirer 0.79 0.30 0.34 0.16
Acquired 0.91 0.20 0.41 0.15
Merged 0.85 0.44 0.34 0.15
Portfolio 0.83 0.23 0.19 0.09
Targets have high mean betas compared to that of the 
acquiring firms as can be seen from Table 6 . By taking 
higher risk firms bidders appear to take additional 
systematic risk that could not be explained by the "p/e 
game" and "portfolio effect", as the difference scores 
reported earlier seem to testify.
In general mergers are associated with an increase in the 
acquiring firm's leverage. The sample taken also shows the 
same pattern with an increase in the acquiring firm's 
leverage from 51 % to 73 %. The increase in systematic risk 
following merger, can also be attributed to the increase in 
leverage, although it is not explicitly tested.
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Another reason for the increase in systematic risk, could 
be the inability of the merger to provide any competitive 
advantage through technical or scale economies, 
transference of general skills and knowhow etc. 
Classification of the merger sample as related and 
unrelated mergers can provide insight into this argument. 
The present study does not aim at such classification due 
to lack of company specific information and difficulties 
involved in the classification process.
Merger, as far as the unsystematic risk is concerned, does 
not provide any further risk reduction than that can be 
achieved by the portfolio investor.
Lubatkin and O'Neill (1987), cite three sources of change 
in unsystematic risk following a merger, namely portfolio 
effect, positive intervention (introducing more effective 
control systems, technological advances that may reduce the 
business risk of a newly acquired firm) and administrative 
pitfalls (due to consolidation efforts) . Since the presence 
of the positive intervention and administrative pitfalls 
must show themselves by an unsystematic risk level that is 
different from what the portfolio effect predicts, the 
acceptance of "portfolio effect" hypothesis eliminates the 
possibility of their presence.
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The results also indicate that the potential for more 
borrowing does not come from a reduction in the operating 
risk. The increase in leverage may be due to large size of 
the merged firm since the sample of bidders, acquired 
firms with market values almost as large as theirs.
Finally, evidence is found to suggest that mergers are not 
effective in mitigating the total risk. Moreover, they lead 
to an increase in risk which if not followed by a 
commensurate increase in return causes to stockholder loss. 
Thus justifying mergers based on risk reduction motive 
must be questioned.
4.3 EXPLANATION OF BETA SHIFTS:
The summary statistics for the three independent variables 
that are used in.the regression model are given in Table 7.
It is seen from Table 7 that on average the sample target 
firms have a market capitalisation of % 97 of that of the 
acquiring firm before the merger, the absolute value of 
the difference in premerger betas between the acquiring and 
target firms is 0.2739 and the relative variance between 
the firms is -0.21609.
The results of the regression which is performed to 
explain the difference between the calculated and predicted 
betas, using the above independent variables are given in 
Table 8 .
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TABLE 7 Stmunary statistics of the independent variables
- Mean Std. dev.
Betad 0.2739 0.1934
Relvar -0.21609 0.3893
Relsize 0.9673 0.8633
TABLE 8 OLS results of the equation
Independent
Variables
Unexp. Intrinsic 
Beta Shift
Unexp. Equity 
Beta Shift
Betad 0.244 0.531
(1) (2.37)* (2.81)*
Relsize 0.0544 0.0495
(1.65) (1.16)
Relvar 0.0592 0.044
(0.78) ■ (0.32)
R ^2 0.47 0.42*
F r- « r-, *5.87 5.62*
DW 1.84 2.06
Correlation 
coeff. Relvar Relsize Relvar Relsize
Relsize -0.159 -0.050
Betad -0.189 -0.306 -0.243 -0.336
NOTE; Regression is run without the constant term, since 
the use of constant has reduced the significance of the 
model and the coefficients.
(1) t-values
**, significant at 5 % level 
*, significant at 1 % level
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It can be seen from Table 8 that Betad is significant at 
the 1 % level, irrespective of the independent variable 
selection (equity beta vs intrinsic beta). Relvar and 
Relsize are found to be insignificant in both models. The 
almost equivalent size of acquiring and acquired firms as 
measured by their market capitalisations may explain the 
insignificance of relsize in explaining unexplained shift 
in beta.
F test results show that both models ape significant at the 
1 % level. The overall fit represented by R^ is very 
strong at 47 % (for intrinsic beta) and 42 % (for equity 
beta). It is also found to be significant at 1 % level. DW 
statistics is greater than the upper critical bounds of d 
test, thus autocorrelation does not exist. Correlation 
coefficients of the independent variables are also given, 
these show no sign of multicollinearity.
Both intrinsic and equity beta models have the same signs 
for the coefficients. Signs are also in line with the 
expectations.
As can be seen from Table 9 the calculated betas are 
somewhat larger than that predicted by CAPM. The difference 
amounts to 0.1163 for the intrinsic beta case (significant 
at 1 % level) and 0.1356 for the equity beta (significant 
at % 1 level) . This finding has been reached before, in
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testing the "portfolio effect" for the equity beta. 
Although both approaches point to a significant shift in 
systematic risk, it is more pronounced in the case of 
equity betas, leading to the conclusion that the financial 
leverage in the acquiring and target firms has been the 
cause of this shift.
TABLE 9 Mean values of the unexplained shift 
in systematic risk
m
Intrinsic
0.1163 (1)
(0.1193)*(2)
Equity
0.13156
(6.2279)
(1) mean values
(2 ) standard deviation
*, significant at % 1 level
Based on the results of this modelling, it can be concluded 
that financial leverage and absolute difference between the 
premerger systematic risks of the acquiring and acquired 
firms are the major variables explaining the rejection of 
the "portfolio effect".
Finally, on the contrary to the previous studies, modelling 
of equity beta has given the same results with the 
intrinsic beta, despite the increase in leverage .
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5. CONCLUSIONS
This study has attempted both to measure and to explain 
the changes in risk attributes following mergers.
The findings show that the impact of merger on
stockholder risk, has not been of a form suggested 
throughout the literature for every risk measure. The 
systematic risk has increased significantly relative to 
that of the acguiring firm and that which capital market 
theory predicts.This implies that on average market takes a 
riskier view of the merged firm than its components. 
Despite the unhypothesized increase in beta, no change has 
been observed in the unsystematic risk of the acquiring 
firm. Merger has not been able to create any opportunity 
for unsystematic risk diversification over what is possible 
to investor. Finally total risk has been found to increase 
significantly compared to premerger value of the acquiring 
firm.
The findings show that risk-reduction can not be a valid 
rationale for mergers and that mergers justified solely on 
the basis of risk reducing properties must be questioned by 
the stockholders. However an increase in risk is not 
necessarily inconsistent with stockholder wealth 
maximization, if it is accompanied by a corresponding 
increase in return.
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'To conclude the study, the difference between systematic 
risk of the merged firm and that predicted by CAPM is 
modelled. Financial leverage and the absolute difference 
between the premerger systematic risks of the acquiring and 
acquired firms are found to be significant in explaining 
the increase in systematic risk. Further research is 
warranted with respect to examination of additional 
explanatory variables.
Finally, caution must be exercised in the generalizability 
of this study due to its small sample size and comparisons 
should be made to studies that cover the same time period 
with the present study, since the conditions of the market 
(bull vs bear) have a significant effect on the level of 
risk and return achieved by mergers.
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a p p e n d i x-1 Merger Sample
Acquiring Firm: Target Firm: Announcement Date:
1-Automated Security 
Centres
Security Centres 11 Oct 85
2-Wlliams Holdings Jackson (J&HB) 02 May 85
3-Norcros UBM 07 May 85
4-Scottish Heritable 
Trust
Hoskins & Horton 16 Feb 85
5-Dalgety Gill & Duffus 
Grp. Ltd.
11 Jul 85
6-BTR Dunlop Holdings 18 Jan 85
7-Unigate Arlington Motor 29 Oct 85
8-Scapa Group United Wire 05 Aug 85
9-Brammer Pic. Energy Services 
& Electronics
19 June 85
10-Newman Tonks Cartwright R 31 Jul 85
11-General Yarrow 01 Sept 85
Electric CO
12-Talbex Group Yorkgreen
Investments
02 Jul 85
13-Stormguard Selincourt 09 Jul 85
14-Polly Peck Intercity
Investment
25 Jul 85
15-Beazer CH Hldgs Leech William 10 Jan 85
16-British Syphon 
Industries
East Lancashire 
Paper Group
15 Dec 84
17-Rea Holdings Applied Botanies 24 Jul 85
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Acquiring Firm: Target Firm: Announcement Date:
18- Racal Electronics
19- Heywwod Williams
20- Rugby Portland 
Cement
21- Harrison 
Crossfield
22- Bremner
23- Sears Hldgs
Chubb & Sons Ltd. 
Planet Group 
Carr (J) Doncaster
Pauls Pic
Phillips 
Patents Hldgs.
Foster Brothers
19 Oct 84 
05 Jun 85 
28 Jun 85
08 May 85
23 Nov 85
15 Apr 85
24- Next Pic
25- Coloroll
26- Evered
27- Crystalate Hldgs.
28- Lake & Elliot
29- Hambro Life 
Assurance
30- Sharpe 
Charles & Co.
31- Comfort Hotels 
International
Grattan
Staffordshire
Potteries
ilawkins & Tipson
Royal Worcester
Suter
BAT Industries 
Booker Me Connell 
Ladbroke Group
0 3 Aug 8 6
01 Aug 86
13 Oct 83
15 Nov 83
16 Apr 85 
15 Feb 85
27 Oct 85
11 Jan 85
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Appendix 2 Test statistics
HYPOTHESES P/E GAME PORTFOLIO EFFECT
BETA
/ [v(B2)-v(Bjjj) j / [var(B )-v(Bj„)]
t(N-2)
UNSYSTEMATIC
RISK
v(Uj„) v(Up)
F(N-2,N-2)
TOTAL
RISK
v(Rxn)
v(%)
V(R2)
F(N-1,N-1)
NOTATION: B; systematic risk
v(U); unsystematic risk 
v (R); total risk
1 ; acquired firm 
2 ; acquiring firm 
m; merged firm
p; market value weighted portfolio of acquiring 
and acquired firms' stocks
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APPENDIX 3 OLS Results of Market Model 
Acquiring firm: Automated Security Centers 
Premerger:
R-square = 0.207
Variance of estimate = 0.00011 
F = 33.06*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0036348
0.0139633
0.0175982
Estimated
coefficient
- 0.00102
0.930
Standard
error
0.0009232
0.1618
t-ratio
-1 .10*
5.75
Post merger:
R-square = 0.112
Variance of estimate = 0.0001623 
F = 19.62**
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0031829
0.0251474
0.0283303
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00178
0.465
Standard
error
0.001026
0.1049
t-ratio
-1.74*
4.43
significant at % 1 level
5 level**, significant at
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Acquiring Firm: Bat Industries
Premerger:
R-square = 0.308
Variance of estimate = 0.0001464 
F = 6 8.01*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0099578
0.0224014
0.0323592
Estimated
coefficient
-0.0009333
0.977
Standard
error
0.0009866
0.1185
t-ratio
-0.95*
8.25
Post merger:
R-square
Variance of estimate 
F
Analysis of variance
- 0.207
- 0.0002468 
= 40.81*
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.010073
0.038507
0.048580
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00152
1.42
Standard
error
0.001251
0.2226
t-ratio
- 1.21
6.39*
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Acquiring Firm: Suter
Premerger:
R-square = 0.072
Variance of estimate = 0.0000949 
F = 10.23**
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.00097077
0.01252653
0.01349730
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00113 
0.363
Standard
error
0.0008489
0.1135
t-ratio
-1.33
3.20*
Post merger:
R-square = 0.174
Variance of estimate = 0.0000723 
F = 35.78*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0025867
0.0122902
0.0148768
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00146
0.518
Standard
error
0.0006517
0.08666
t-ratio
-2.24
5.98*
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Acquiring Firm: Stormguard
Premerger:
R-square
Variance of estimate 
F
Analysis of variance
explained 0.0004820 
unexplained 0.0470045
=  0.001 
= 0.0003948 
=  1.22
total
Variable
name
0.0474866
Estimated
coefficient
Standard
error
t-ratio
Ait
Rm
■0.00251
0.325
0.001807
0.2942
-1.39
1.10
Post merger:
R-square = 0.052
Variance of estimate = 0.0000131 
F = 8.67**
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0048184
0.0872887
0.0921071
Estimated
coefficient
-0.003
0.911
Standard
error
0.001923
0.3095
t-ratio
-1.56
2.94*
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Acquiring Firm: Dalgety
Premerger:
R-square
Variance of estimate 
F
Analysis of variance
= 0.322 
= 0.0000307 
= 56.51*
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0017348
0.0036533
0.0053881
Estimated
-0.000788
0.636
Standard
error
0.0005037
0.08456
t-ratio
-1.56 
7.52 *
Post merger:
R-square = 0.107
Variance of estimate = 0.0001929 
F = 15.7 **
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0030275
0.0252679
0.0282954
Estimated
coefficient
0.0002
0.525
Standard
error
0 .
0 .
001211
1326
t-ratio
0.17 
3.96 *
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Acquiring Firm: Rugby Group
Premerger:
R-square = 0.196
Variance of estimate = 0.00007 
F = 34.09*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
0.0023914
0.0098201
0.0122116
Estimated
coefficient
Standard
error
t-ratio
Ait
Rm
-0.000617
0.591
0.0007032 -0.88
0.101&a3816H5.84*
Post merger:
R-square - 0. 42
Variance of estimate = 0.000072 
F = 7.10**
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
0.00051243
0.01155149
0.01206391
Estimated
coefficient
Standard
error
t-ratio
Ait
Rm
0.000821
0.203
0.0006768
0.07620
1.21
2 .66*
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Acquiring Firm: Heywood Williams
Premerger:
R-square = 0.017
Variance of estimate = 0.0000767 
F =2.16
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.00016599
0.00943877
0.00960476
Estimated
coefficient
-0.000159
-0.169
Standard
err
0.0007942
0.1150
t-ratio
- 0.20
-1.47
Post merger:
R-square = 0.048
Variance of estimate = 0.0000236 
F =6.96
Analysis of variance
explained 0.00016449 
unexplained 0.00323817
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.00340265
Estimated
coefficient
0.000106
0.178
Standard
error
0.0004132
0.06742
t-ratio
0.26 
2.64*
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Acquiring Firm: Sears
Premerger:
R-square = 0.403
Variance of estimate = 0.000124 
F = 88.61*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.011006 
0.016271 
0.027277
Estimated
coefficient
-0.000988
1.27
Standard
error
0.0009742
0.1349
t-ratio
- 1.01
9.41*
Post merger:
R-square ” 0.293
Variance of estimate = 0.0001185 
F =71.5*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0084429
0.0204103
0.0288532
Estimated
coefficient
-0.000294
1.. 21
Standard
error
0.0008272
0.1437
t-ratio
-0.36
8.43*
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Acquiring Firm: Next
Premerger:
R-square = 0.305
Variance of estimate = 0.0001313 
F = 52.63*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
0.0069153
0.0157662
0.0226815
Estimated
coefficient
Standard
error
t-ratio
Ait
Rm
-0.00067
0.970
0.001a3816H-0.64 
0.1337 7.25*
Post merger:
R-square
Variance of estimate 
F
Analysis of variance
= 0.256 
= 0.0001196 
= 60.88*
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0072809
0.0211676
0.0284485
Estimated
coefficient
-0.000389
0.931
Standard
error
0.0008447
0.1193
t-ratio
-0.46
7.8*
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Acquiring Firm: Harrison Crossfield>
Premerger:
R-square = 0.134
Variance of estimate = 0.0000358 
F = 18.32**
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.00065689
0.00423091
0.00480780
Estimated
coefficient
-0.000316
0.370
Standard
error
0.0005533
0.08654
t-tio
-0.57
4.28*
Post merger:
R-square = 0.05
Variance of estimate = 0.0000557 
F = 10.24**
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.00057132
0.01093023
0.01150155
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00167
0.282
Standard
error
0.0005326
0.08803
t-ratio
-3.13
3.2*
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Acquiring Firm: Dremner
Premerger:
R-square = 0.01
Variance of estimate = 0.000235 
F = 1.46
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0003440
0.0338328
0.0341768
Estimated
coefficient
-0.001124
0.265
Standard
error
0.001271
0.21
t-ratio
- 0.88
1.21
Post merger:
R-square
Variance of estimate 
F
Analysis of variance
= 0.016 
= 0.0001227 
= 2.16
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0002647
0.0166982
0.0169629
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00240
0.190
Standard
error
0.000963
0.1295
t-ratio
-2.50
1.47
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Acquiring Firm: Ladbroke
Premerger:
R-square = 0.198
Variance of estimate = 0.0001425 
P = 30.45
Analysis of variance
explained
Unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0043436
0.0175470
0.0218906
Estimated
coefficient
0.945
Standard
error
0.0011
0.1712
t-ratio
-0.09
5.52*
Post merger:
R-square = 0.242
Variance of estimate = 0.0000827 
P =48.02
Analysis of variance
explained
Unexplained
total
Variable
Uame
Ait
Rin
0.0040078
0.0125822
0.0165900
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00125
0.784
Standard
error
0.0007348
0.1127
t-ratio
-1.70
6.96*
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Acquiring Firm: Ladbroke
Premerger:
R-square = 0.198
Variance of estimate = 0.0001425 
F = 30.45
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0043436
0.0175470
0.0218906
Estimated
coefficient
0.945
Standard
error
0.0011 
0.1712
t-ratio
-0.09
5.52*
Post merger:
R-square = 0.242
Variance of estimate = 0.0000827 
F = 48.02
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0040078
0.0125822
0.0165900
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00125
0.784
Standard
error
0.0007348
0.1127
t-ratio
-1.70
6.96*
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Acquiring Firm: Coloroll
Premerger:
R-square = 0.123
Variance of estimate = 0.0001481 
F = 16.52**
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0024472
0.0174800
0.0199272
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00066 
0.562
Standard
error
0.001124
0.1382
t-tio
-0.59 
4.06*
Post merger:
R-square = 0.039
Variance of estimate = 0.000183 
F =7.71
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0014112
0.0351286
0.0365397
Estimated
coefficient
0.0021
0.351
Standard
error
0.0009909
0.1265
t-ratio
2.12 
2.78*
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Acquiring Firm: Unigate
Premerger:
R-square = 0.325
Variance of estimate = 0.0000559 
F = 67.04*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
0.0037515
0.0077785
0.0115300
Estimated
coefficient
Standard
error
t-ratio
Ait
Rm
0.0012
0.926
0.000631
0.1131
1.90
89*
Post merger:
R-square = 0.287
Variance of estimate = 0.0001304 
F = 63.51*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
0.0082863
0.0206139
0.0289002
Estimated
coefficient
Standard
error
t-ratio
Ait
Rm
■0.000216
1.00
0.0009123
0.1255
-0.24
7.97*
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Acquiring Firm: Booker Me Connell
Premerger:
R-square = 0.201
Variance of estimate = 0.0001108 
F = 35.29*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0039104
0.0155122
0.0194226
Estimated
coefficient
0.000188
0.913
Standard
error
0.0008844
0.1537
t-ratio
0.21
5.94*
Post merger:
R-square == 0.28
Variance of estimate = 0.0001121 
F = 55.73*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0062469
0.0160300
0.0222769
Estimated
coefficient
-0.000840
0:943
Standard
error
0.0009007
0.1263
t-ratio
-0.93
7.47*
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Acquiring Firm: Scapa Group
Premerger:
R-square = 0.198
Variance of estimate = 0.0000748 
F = 29.60*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0022160
0.0089846
0.0112006
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00124
0.730
Standard
error
0.0007834
0.1341
t-ratio
-1.59
5.44*
Post merger:
R-square = 0.168
Variance of estimate = 0.0000669 
F = 32.02*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0021435
0.0106436
0.0127871
Estimated
coefficient
0.000168
0.585
Standard
error
0.0006672
0.1035
t-ratio
0.25
5.66*
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Acquiring Firm: General Electric
Premerger:
R-square =0.401
Variance of estimate = 0.0001048 
F = 90.47*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0094807
0.0141476
0.0236283
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00249
1.16
Standard
error
0.0008951
0.1224
t-ratio
- 2. 
9.51*
Post merger:
R-square = 0.296
Variance of estimate = 0.0002079 
F = 62.16*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.012919
0.030761
0.043679
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00144
1.60
Standard
error
0.001180
0.2036
t-ratio
- 1.22
7.88*
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Acquiring Firm: Norcros
Premerger:
R-square = 0.129
Variance of estimate = 0.0000904 
F = 18.58**
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0016800
0.0113001
0.0129801
Estimated 
coeffient
-0.000475
0.515
Standard
error
0.0008546
0.1196
t-ratio
-0.56
4.31*
Post merger:
R-square = 0.088
Variance of estimate = 0.0001444 
F = 16.00**
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0023107
0.0239805
0.0262912
Estimated
coefficient
0.00103
0.628
Standard
error
0.0009298
0.1570
t-ratio
1.11
4.00*
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Acquiring Firm: Talbex
Premerger:
R-square
Variance of estimate
= 0.069 
= 0.02276 
= 8.58
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0044424 
0.0595460 
0.0639885
Estimated
coefficient
- 0.00112 
0.914
Standard
error
0.002104
0.3121
t-ratio
-0.53
2.93*
Post merger:
R-square
Variance of estimate 
F
Analysis of variance
= 0.06 
- 0.0009872 
= 0.94
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0009267
0.1668773
0.1678040
Estimated
coefficient
-0.000760
0.270
Standard
error
0.002434
0.2782
t-ratio
-0.31
0.97
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Acquiring Fixiiii Newman Tonks
Premerger:
R-square = 0.032
Variance of estimate = 0.0000472 F =4.49
Analysis of variance
explained 0.00021247 
unexplained 0.00652294 
total "^
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.00673541
Estimated 
coefficient
-0.000096 
0.173
Standard
error
0.0005811
0.08155
t-ratio
-0.16 
2 .12*
Post merger:
R-square - 0.032
Variance of estimate = 0.0001742 
F =4.72
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0008229
0.0250968
0.0259197
Estimated
coefficient
0.00002
0.404
Standard
error
0.001120
0.1861
t-ratio
0.02
2.17*
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Acquiring Firm: Polly Peck
Premerger:
R-square
Variance of estimate
A n aly sis  of variance
= -0.074 
= 0.000225 
= 10.76**
explained
unexplained
t o t a l
Variable
name
A i t
Rm
0.0024223 
0.0303817 
0.0328100
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00209
0.604
Standard
error
0.001282 
0.1840
t - r a t i o
-1 .6 3  
3.28*
Post merger:
R-square -  0.12
Variance of estimate = 0.000388 
p = 22.40**
A n alysis  of variance
explained
unexplained
t o t a l
V ariable
name
A i t
Rm
0.0086889
0.0640167
0.0727055
Estimated
c o e f f i c i e n t
-0.00364
1 .1 5
Standard
error
0.00159
0.2433
t - r a t i o
-2.29
4.73*
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Acquiring Firm; Beazer CH.
Premerger:
R-square = 0.166
Variance of estimate = 0.0000299 
F = 25.19**
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
V ariable
name
Ait
Rm
0.00075476
0.00380543
0.00456019
Estimated
c o e f f i c i e n t
0.0003669
0.316
Standard
error
0.0004912
0.06303
t - r a t i o
0.75
5.02*
Post merger:
R-square
Variance of  estimate  
F
A n a ly s is  of variance
= 0.081 
= 0.0000692 
= 16.39**
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0011350
0.0128122
0.0139471
Estimated
coefficient
0.000838
0.374
Standard
error
0.0006090
0.09242
t-ratio
1.38
4.05*
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Acquiring Firm: British Syphon
Premerger:
R-square - 0.091
Variance of estimate = 0.0001212
p =12.16
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
t o t a l
V ariable
name
A
Rm
0.0014878
0.0148003
0.0162881
Estimated
coefficient
0.000341
0.415
Standard
error
0.0009965
0.1185
t-ratio
0.34 
3.50*
Post merger:
R-square -  0*034
Variance of estimate = 0.0001252
p =6 .2 0
A n aly sis  of  variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0007768
0.0220459
0.0228227
Estimated
coefficient
0.000152
0.356
Standard
error
0.008448
0.1230
t - r a t i o
0.18
2.49*
Acquiring Firm: Rea Holdings
Premerger:
R-square = 0.102
Variance of estimate = 0.0000366 
F = 15.2
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.00055383
0.00487162
0.00542546
Estimated
coefficient
-0.000907
0.292
Standard
error
0.0005211
0.07518
t-ratio
-1.74 
3.89*
Post merger:
Variance of estimate = 0.0001658 
F =4.29
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0007125
0.0293658
0.0300782
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00182
0.227
Standard
error
0.0009828
0.1096
t-ratio
-1.85 
2.07*
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Acquiring Firm: Racal Electronics
Premerger:
R-square ~ 0.309
Va]^iance of ©stimate = 0.0001552 
p = 63.54*
Analysis of variance
explained 0.0098697
unexplained 0.0220566 
total 0.0319263
Variable
name
Ait
Estimated
coefficient
0.00102
Standard
error
0.001039
t-ratio
0.99
7.97*
Post merger:
R-square - 0.221
Variance of estimate ~ 0.0005764 
p = 69.24*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.039910
0.140639
0.180549
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00334
1.93
Standard
error
0.00154
0.2316
t-ratio
-2.17
8.32*
79
Acquiring Firm: Brammer
Premerger:
R-square
Variance of estimate
= 0.041 
= 0.0003511 
= 5.77
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
V a ria b le
name
Ait
Rm
0.0020257
0.0477840
0.0498097
Estimated
coefficient
-0.00056
0.553
Standard
error
0.001607
0.2303
t - r a t i o
-0 .35  
2.40*
Post merger:
_- - r e  = 0.049
Variance of estimate = 0.0002948
p = 8 . 1 6
A n a ly s is  of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0024059
0.0468735
0.0492794
Estimated
coefficient
0.00035
0.435
Standard
error
0.001358
0.1524
t - r a t i o
0.26
2 .86*
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Acquiring Firms BTR
Premerger:
vliiance of estimate ^„ = 149.121*F
Analysis of variance
explained 0.016058
unexplained 0.015282 
total 0.031341
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
Estimatedcoefficient
0.000415
1.35
Standard
error
0.0008816 
0.1101
t-ratio
0.47 
12.22*
Post mergers
R-squareVariance of estimate
0.489
= 0.000114 
= 135.14*
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.015421
0.016090
0.031510
Estimated
coefficient
-0.000431
1.85
Standard
error
0.0008945
0.1594
t-ratio
-0.48
11.62*
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Acquiring Firm: Scottish Heritable Trust
Premerger:
R-square
Variance of estimate
= 0.033 
= 0.0000801 
= 4.41
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.00035345
0.01050221
0.01085566
Estimated
coefficient
0.00026
0.204
Standard
error
0.0007957
0.09724
t-ratio
0.33 
2 .10*
Post merger:
R-square - 0.003
Variance of estimate = 0.0001075 
p =0.45
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0000487
0.0159272
0.0159759
Estimated
coefficient
0:0018
- 0.101
Standard
error
0.0008477
0.1495
t-ratio
2.12
-0.67
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Acquiring Firm: Williams holdings
Premerger:
R-square
Variance of estimate 
F
Analysis of variance
= 0.064 
= 0.0001817 
=  8.02
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0014559
0.0214286
0.0228845
Estimated
coefficient
0.00356
0.489
Standard
error
0.001243
0.1729
t-ratio
2.86
2.83*
Post merger:
R-square
Variance of estimate 
F
Analysis of variance
explained
unexplained
total
Variable
name
Ait
Rm
0.0002 
83.0696 
83.0698
=  0.0
-  0.485809 
= 0
Estimated
coefficient
0.05
- 0.12
Standard
error
0.05308
6.258
t-ratio
0.94
- 0.02
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